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ABSTRACT
Linguistic deception theory provides methods to discover potentially deceptive texts to make
them accessible to clerical review. This paper proposes the integration of these linguistic
methods with traditional e-discovery techniques to identify deceptive texts within a given
author’s larger body of written work, such as their sent email box. First, a set of linguistic
features associated with deception are identified and a prototype classifier is constructed to
analyze texts and describe the features’ distributions, while avoiding topic-specific features to
improve recall of relevant documents. The tool is then applied to a portion of the Enron Email
Dataset to illustrate how these strategies identify records, providing an example of its
advantages and capability to stratify the large data set at hand.
Keywords: e-discovery, deception detection, anomaly detection, forensic linguistics, natural
language processing

1.

INTRODUCTION

The field of electronic discovery (e-discovery),
which concerns itself with practices for
identifying electronic evidence relevant to
investigations or litigation, faces a variety of
challenges, ranging from data sets which
exponentially increase in size and complexity
to aging text processing techniques that some
have gone so far as to call “primitive” (Kroll
Ontrack, 2013; Oard & Webber, 2013).
Contemporary data sets are so large that
processing by having a human review and
categorize them is prohibitively expensive
(Tingen, 2012). In order to more accurately
and efficiently process these data, legal teams
and courts need to be aware of what advanced
technologies are available, how best to employ
them and what their limitations are (Tingen,
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2012). In addition, they must be prepared to
defend their chosen course of action and
justify its use (Kroll Ontrack, 2013; Tingen,
2012). Linguistic methods can provide
theoretically rich, empirically valid methods
to help support these decisions.
This paper explains how a linguistic text
classifier can serve as an advanced search
technique and how it may be used to detect
records which are more likely to contain
deceptive information. The proposed classifier
benefits from theories of linguistic deception
and techniques shown to identify relevant
features, providing a tool which is cost
effective and informative to improve search
results. This linguistically-based approach is
fundamentally different from many current
search technologies because it draws attention
and focus to an author’s linguistic style,
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rather than relying on the words he or she
uses. After all, the words found in an email
may be misleading (Baron et al., 2007); for
example, rather than intending a literal
interpretation, an author may intend to
communicate sarcasm or be making an
allusion. In order to circumvent these issues,
this paper provides a framework for
summarizing language patterns and discourse
quality within each example of an author’s
work, and then comparing them to find the
most suspect texts. Section 2 will summarize
the challenges and methods current in the ediscovery field as documented by recent
survey works. Section 3 will address linguistic
techniques for deception detection and detail
how they are relevant to e-discovery. In
section 4, I shall discuss preliminary results
obtained from a proof-of-concept model
exploring one author’s email collection from
the Enron Email Data Set (EDRM, LLC,
2014). Finally, section 5 concludes the paper
with suggestions for further research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
As noted by Tingen (2012) and Belt, Kiker,
and Shetterly (2012), some within the legal
field have resisted adopting new technology
for e-discovery efforts. Although some
members of the legal profession have defended
manual review, this is a time-consuming and
expensive process, costing up to five hundred
dollars an hour for review (Tingen, 2012).
However, despite the price and time required
for human review, previous studies such as
Grossman and Cormack (2011) have shown
that technology-assisted review not only
requires less effort, but produces more
accurate results. However, while the promise
of reducing effort on the part of law firms
certainly encourages the use of reviewassisting products, the quality of returned
data is dependent on a number of factors,
including the quality of the original data (is it
complete, with uncorrupted files), the
methods the software employs (is it using
basic, complex or a combination of search
strategies), and their implementations (is the
algorithmic interpretation of the search
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function stable and error-free) (Grossman &
Cormack, 2011).

2.1 Modern Search Techniques
Tingen (2012) and the Sedona Conference
(Baron et al., 2007) catalogue several of the
most common e-discovery techniques and
describe how they vary in intended
application and sophistication (Grossman &
Cormack, 2011; Tingen, 2012).
The most basic method is one many
internet users are familiar with: keyword
search. A keyword search strategy typically
involves developing a list of potentially
relevant terms and phrases, and then
searching text data for occurrences of those
words (Tingen, 2012). While its ease of use
has led to its widespread implementation, not
all relevant documents necessarily include one
or more of the keywords searched for. The
reverse is also true: containing a keyword is
not a guarantee of a document’s relevance
(Tingen, 2012). A further complication arises
from the fact that keyword searches often
only match exact strings; words with spelling
errors or inflected words, such as walked
instead of walk, may not be returned (Tingen,
2012).
Utilizing Boolean operators and fuzzy
search technologies permits more flexibility in
what is still essentially keyword searching.
For example, the Boolean operator wildcard,
often represented as *, indicates to the
computer that any character may take the
wildcard’s place and that any pattern match
should be a returned result (Tingen, 2012).
Therefore, using a Boolean operator search for
read* may return documents containing not
only read, but also reader, reading, and ready
(Tingen, 2012). Similarly, fuzzy search
techniques attempt to account for human
error by weighting letters in a word according
to their position and allowing for low-weight
letters to differ (Tingen, 2012).
Other search tools include ontologies and
taxonomies, Bayesian classifiers, document
clustering methods, such as topic modeling,
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and recently, sentiment analysis (Tingen,
2012; Baron et al., 2007). Ontologies and
taxonomies also serve to expand the
usefulness of keyword searching, allowing the
computer to retrieve keyword synonyms
(Baron et al., 2007; Tingen, 2012). For
example, if one were to use a taxonomy and
search for pen, results may include ballpoint,
rollerball or felt tip. Bayesian classifiers use
probability algorithms to determine document
relevance by weighting particular words or
phrases, taking into account their frequency,
and also by examining the document’s
proximity and similarity to others in the set
(Tingen, 2012). Document clustering involves
statistically analyzing the words in each
document in the data set and grouping it with
others with similar statistical measurements
(Tingen, 2012). Sentiment analysis involves
classifying words within a text according to
their emotional value (Pang & Lee, 2008).
The measurements of emotion can vary
greatly; some sentiment classifiers try to
determine whether or not a given sentence is
negative or positive by averaging emotion
scores across all the words in a sentence, while
others go so far as to classify sentences
according to the “six “universal” emotions […]:
anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and
surprise,” (Pang & Lee, 2008).
The techniques discussed in the previous
paragraph possess an advantage over simple
keyword searches: as discussed by (Baron et
al., 2007), when used effectively, they can
reveal unexpected results by identifying
related concepts that human operators may
not have associated before. Each of these
methods is effective at returning some
proportion of relevant records, but they all
share a similar limitation.

2.2 The Limitation of Looking at Words
As can be seen, all of these techniques rely on
the presence of words, whether they are the
particular words being looked for in a
keyword search, or related concepts being
united through document clustering. However,
authors do not always use words in the way
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they were intended (Baron et al., 2007), and
sometimes, the absence of words is far more
important than a keyword search may
indicate. This is an acknowledged problem in
the realm of sentiment analysis: developing
methods for identifying sarcastic text, for
example, is still a current challenge
(González-Ibáñez, Muresan, & Wacholder,
2011).
Zhou et al. (2003) defines deception as,
“the active transmission of messages and
information to create a false conclusion.” The
authors further specify that there must be an
intent to deceive; messages that a transmitter
does not know are false are not considered
deceptive under this definition (Zhou,
Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker,
2003). These messages can deceive in different
ways. While some involve the transmission of
misleading information, it is also possible to
deceive with one’s writing style to hide the
identity of the author (Afroz, Brennan, &
Greenstadt, 2012; Brennan, Afroz &
Greenstadt, 2012; Juola, 2012). Although the
transmission of misleading information is the
focus of this study, stylistic deception will be
briefly addressed as well (Afroz, Brennan, &
Greenstadt, 2012; Brennan, Afroz &
Greenstadt, 2012; Juola, 2012).
Past studies have shown that during
deceptive interaction, there are a variety of
cues which can indicate the deception (Zhou,
Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker,
2003). However, due to the relatively recent
rise in computer-mediated communication
(CMC), the majority of research identifying
these deceptive indicators has focused on faceto-face, human-to-human interaction (Enos,
Shriberg, Graciarena, Hirschberg & Stolcke,
2007; Fitzpatrick & Bachenko, 2009; Zhou,
Burgoon, & Twitchell, 2003; Zhou, Twitchell,
Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2003). Further
research into linguistic methods of detecting
deception is needed; due to the fact that
many of the indicators previously studied,
such as pupil dilation and pressing lips
together,
are
unavailable
when
the
interaction’s participants are separated by
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time, space and technology (Keila &
Skillicorn, 2005; Lee, Welker, & Odom, 2009;
Zhou,
Twitchell,
Qin,
Burgoon,
&
Nunamaker, 2003). The following section will
discuss deception in CMC and how it may be
measured.

2.3 Linguistic Techniques for Deception
Detection
The scope of our search can be broadened by
examining categories of words rather than just
words themselves. This section examines
previous literature on deception, focusing on
studies centered on CMC, and identifies
features which will be implemented in the
model classifier (see section 4).

2.4 Deception in Explicit Experimental
Space
While the literature on deception as a speech
act is quite rich, deception in CMC is a
sparsely studied field, in part due to the
difficulty of collecting authentic data. Lee,
Welker, and Odom (2009), Hancock, Curry,
Goorha, and Woodworth (2008) and Zhou,
Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, and Nunamaker
(2003) together with Zhou, Burgoon, and
Twitchell (2003) employ similar experimental
methods, which involve encouraging some
participants to deceive a randomly assigned,
anonymous
communication
partner.
(Incentivizing experimental participants to
deceive has also been undertaken in face-toface communication studies, such as Enos,
Shriberg, Graciarena, Hirschberg, and Stolcke
(2007).) The language used by the deceptive
and non-deceptive participants was then
compared in order to identify whether or not
there were language patterns endemic to
deception, and if so, what they were
(Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth,
2008; Lee, Welker, & Odom, 2009; Zhou,
Burgoon, & Twitchell, 2003; Zhou, Twitchell,
Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2003). In each
study, students were anonymously paired with
others, and each of these communication
dyads was then instructed to communicate
about some outside entity (Lee, Welker, &
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Odom, 2009; Zhou, Burgoon, & Twitchell,
2003; Zhou, Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, &
Nunamaker, 2003). In Zhou, Twitchell, Qin,
Burgoon, and Nunamaker (2003) and Zhou,
Burgoon, and Twitchell (2003), students were
told to reach agreement on a ranking of items
which would be most useful in surviving in
the desert using asynchronic CMC. The other
study involved one student describing the
state of real estate properties to an inquiring
party via a specially-designed email system
(the other student) (Lee, Welker, & Odom,
2009). Unlike the others, the Hancock, Curry,
Goorha, and Woodworth (2008) study
involved synchronic communication between
participants through computer terminals; they
were still deprived of face-to-face interaction,
but responses were potentially much more
immediate.
In all three cases, at least one of each pair
of students was presented with some level of
motivation to deceive their partner. However,
as noted above, these interactions are not
what one could consider “real-world” as they
would not have occurred outside the
experimental sphere. Although the authors
attempts to mitigate this by informing some
participants assigned to the deceptive group
that their partner’s belief was important,
there was little to no real risk involved with
being unsuccessful with their deception
attempts (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, &
Woodworth, 2008); as Lee, Welker, and Odom
(2009) note, “The kinds of messages that
people construct defensively when lying to a
superior who can exact harm on them may
differ from the kinds of messages that
individuals construct when lying to unknown
students…”
The linguistic features examined in the
articles described thus far varied, but each
one identified some cues which were
significantly associated with the act of
deception. Zhou, Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon,
and Nunamaker (2003) determined that use of
ellipsis, wordiness, passive voice, second
person address and possessive forms were
significantly indicative. The authors also
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found that deceptive study participants used
more words (especially verbs, modifiers and
noun phrases) and yet also displayed less
lexical and content diversity (Zhou, Twitchell,
Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2003). Zhou,
Burgoon, & Twitchell (2003) confirmed the
significance of these features, but also shed
light on the importance of chronology in
deception analysis. They found that at the
beginning of a deception, the cues available
for analysis are “fair [in] number”, and as time
progresses, they shift in number, increasing
and then decreasing until the end of the
communicative event, at which time very few
cues are exposed; furthermore, not all cues
were significant over all time periods (Zhou,
Burgoon, & Twitchell, 2003). To mitigate this
chronological challenge, the authors suggest
either merging all messages or selecting
certain messages toward the middle of a
communicative event for further scrutiny
(Zhou, Burgoon, & Twitchell, 2003).
Following this guidance, the model classifier
proposed in section 4 below functions on a
merged set which is not chronologically
separated.
The increase in wordiness found by Zhou,
Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, and Nunamaker
(2003) was corroborated by Hancock, Curry,
Goorha, and Woodworth (2008). Additionally,
it was determined that deceptive participants
used fewer causal words (such as because or
effect) when lying (Hancock, Curry, Goorha,
& Woodworth, 2008). Deceptive participants
were also more likely to use sense-related
words (see or listen) when they were not
telling the truth.
According to Afroz, Brennan and
Greenstadt (2012), function words are the
most useful, content-independent features for
detecting deceptive writing.
Additionally,
they state that these function word features
can be used to identify style deceptions; that
is, although an author can alter their style to
hide their identity, function words can be
used to determine that style obfuscation has
taken place (Afroz, Brennan, and Greenstadt,
2012). Juola (2012) also successfully utilized
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character trigrams (series of three characters,
such as cha or har from character) to detect
imitation and stylistic obfuscation.
Lee, Welker, and Odom (2009) elaborated
on the difference between deceiver and truthteller content words, stating that deceivers’
messages included more causation words, firstperson singular pronouns, present-tense verbs
and tenacity verbs. This finding regarding
first-person singular references is somewhat
different from one of the findings reported in
Zhou,
Twitchell,
Qin,
Burgoon,
and
Nunamaker (2003), where the authors found
that group references were significant, but
first-person singular references were not. In
comparison, Hancock, Curry, Goorha, and
Woodworth (2008) found that first-person
references fell in number during deceptive
communication. In light of the disagreement,
the model classifier (see section 4) will
examine these features (first-person singular
and first-person plural references) separately.
It is possible these observed differences may
be due to the context of the conversation: for
example, when discussing desert survival such
as in the Lee, Welker, and Odom (2009)
study, it may be more prudent to refer to the
survival of the group rather than oneself.

2.5 Deception in Real-World Data
While these findings are an excellent place of
departure, it is also important to verify their
findings with research on real-world data, if
and when available (Feng, Banerjee & Choi,
2012; Fitzpatrick & Bachenko, 2009; Lee,
Welker, & Odom, 2009; Zhou, Burgoon, &
Twitchell, 2003; Zhou, Twitchell, Qin,
Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2003). Any data not
produced as the prompting of a study could
be considered real-world; for example, Feng,
Banerjee and Choi (2012) use reviews
collected from several review websites while
Fitzpatrick and Bachenko (2009) collect both
spoken and written narratives from sources
such as Court TV and police case files.
The Enron Email Data Set is a large
collection of real world emails released to the
public domain. It is comprised of the mail
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folders of 150 former Enron employees,
including some of the top executives who were
later prosecuted, some of whom were
convicted of deception based crimes (EDRM,
LLC, 2014). What is important is that the
data were not motivated by a study, and it is
reasonable to assume that some of the emails
within the set contain evidence of deception
(Keila & Skillicorn, 2005).
Keila and Skillicorn (2005) examine the
Enron Email Data Set in detail. The authors
built a classifier which ranked emails by the
likelihood that they contained deception based
on the measurement of a variety of linguistic
features (Keila & Skillicorn, 2005). This
approach, in essence, identifies emails which
deviate most from a model of language, rather
than trying to predict whether each individual
text is deceptive (Keila & Skillicorn, 2005).
Although the authors’ tool does not
discriminate the identities of senders or
receivers of email, they state that their
approach can also be applied successfully to
the emails of a single person to identify their
most unusual messages (Keila & Skillicorn,
2005).
Gupta (2007) proposes the use of the
Pennebaker deception model to find deceptive
emails within the Enron Email Data Set
(EDRM, LLC, 2014). The applied model relies
on changing frequencies of personal pronouns,
exclusive words, negative-emotion words and
action words (Gupta, 2007). However, the
sparsity of the created model (due to the lack
of most words not occurring in most of the
texts) results in the need for specialized
normalization procedures to prevent zero
values from unduly influencing the model
(Gupta, 2007). While Gupta (2007) suggests
that deception word features can be
customized to suit any domain, the danger of
data sparsity remains. It also does not take
into account syntax (such as the noun drive
as compared with the verb drive), context or
literary devices, which can all affect the
meaning of a used word in a text (Gupta,
2007).
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Louwerse, Lin, Drescher, and Semin
(2010) follow in the footsteps of Keila and
Skillicorn (2005) and Gupta (2007) and
examine the Enron Email Data Set (EDRM,
LLC, 2014). Using linguistic categories and
several derived features, they analyze the data
set to determine if certain features could be
linked to fraudulent events (Louwerse, Lin,
Drescher, & Semin, 2010; EDRM, LLC, 2014).
They conclude that abstractness (which was
calculated using a formula to compare usage
of verbs and adjectives) is most indicative of
fraudulent events in the corpus (Louwerse,
Lin, Drescher, & Semin, 2010). However, they
qualify their findings by stating, “By no
means are we arguing that by using the LCM
model we can predict whether an email
consists of fraudulent information or not,”
(Louwerse, Lin, Drescher, & Semin, 2010).
A similar model to the one proposed in
this paper was reported by Feng, Banerjee
and Choi (2012). The authors built a classifier
which utilized both lexical and syntactic rule
features to uncover deception in several
different corpora of reviews (Feng, Banerjee &
Choi, 2012). However, this requires a deep
syntactic parser for the language being
studied, which may not available and may
have varying accuracy rates (Feng, Banerjee
& Choi, 2012). Their process also relies on
lexical features, which they state have been
identified as useful within a specific genre,
such as reviews (Feng, Banerjee & Choi,
2012).

3. MODEL
In this section, two methods of modeling and
identifying unusual texts within a single
author’s texts will be outlined, along with
their results. Both models will rely on the
same set of generalized linguistic as opposed
to lexical features; this avoids overfitting the
models to specific lexical items as seen in
Gupta (2007). Although Feng, Banerjee and
Choi (2012) identify that word-based features
can be useful in genre-specific deception
detection, the current study does not employ
them. This is because the genres of emails
included cannot be guaranteed, and this
© 2014 ADFSL
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model is intended to be run over potentially
genre-mixed data; for example, some emails
may be formal business electronic letters,
while others may be very personal and
informal, incorporating conventions such as
emoticons and numeric substitutions.

3.1 Data Set
Both classification methods were run on a
portion of the Enron Email Data Set, due to
the fact that it is publicly available and is
comprised of real-world data (EDRM, LLC,
2014; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005). As discussed
previously, this model seeks to find interesting
records within a specific author’s work (as
opposed to drawing comparisons across a
population) and demonstrate the value of
linguistic feature-based email ranking as an
investigative tool. Fornaciari and Poesio
(2012) conclude from their study of deception
in court transcripts that, “increasing
homogeneity [of subsets] is effective provided
that the remaining set is still sufficiently
large.” Therefore, the data set is composed of
emails sent or drafted by one author within
the Enron Email Data Set, who will be
unnamed in the interest of privacy (EDRM,
LLC, 2014). The data set for the present
experiment was built by exporting the
mailbox of this single author from the full
collection, and then removing all messages not
written by him; for example, all emails
received were removed, as were forwarded
portions of those he sent. As he was one of
the first Enron executives prosecuted, it is
reasonable to assume that his emails may
contain items of interest, although they may
not necessarily be deceptive (Keila &
Skillicorn, 2005). It is important to note that
although no definitive identification of
deceptive emails is possible, as no groundtruth is available, the purpose of the model is
to identify potentially relevant or interesting
documents which may be unresponsive to
topic
searching
or
predictive
coding
techniques.

3.2 Methods
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To begin, a list of relevant features, derived
from those identified in the deception
detection literature, was assembled. Other
features were then added to create a more
robust language model for each email, and the
complete list of features can be seen in Table
1 below (EDRM, LLC, 2014). For each of the
part of speech and word count features, emails
were first split into sentences using the
Natural Language Toolkit sentence tokenize
function (Bird, Loper, & Klein, 2009). Each
sentence was then tokenized on the word level
and passed through the Penn Treebank part
of speech tagger (Bird, Loper, & Klein, 2009).
Frequencies for relevant part of speech tags
were calculated within each sentence, and
some tag values were condensed; for example,
one condensed tag set is comprised of nouns
and noun phrases, as lexical diversity was the
feature of interest, not types of noun phrases.
Finally, these tag-per-sentence frequency
values are averaged across the sentences
within the email to form the email-level
feature.
Two analytic methods for reviewing the
emails were then employed. First, WEKA, a
tool comprised of machine-learning algorithms
published originally by Hall et al. (2009), was
used to create a cluster-based classification.
The mean feature values for each cluster were
then examined to identify which had higher
means for parts of the speech associated with
deception. The goal of employing this method
was to identify groups of emails with similar
patterns of language variation, on the basis
that the most interesting clusters could then
be extracted for analysis.
The second method involved calculating
the mean values for each feature in isolation,
identifying what emails had statistically
significant differences for deception-relevant
features, and subjecting these to human
review.
For comparison, a list of keyword terms
were put together and run on the data set as
well. As discussed in section 2.1 above, there
are many “predictive coding” tools available
on the software market (Grossman &
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Cormack, 2011). It is my assumption that the
results obtained from one tool’s use may be
very different from another. As it is not the
goal of this paper to judge the efficiency of
particular industry tools, I have chosen to
employ a traditional keyword and Boolean
operator search of the data using Python. In
order to facilitate this, emails were converted
to plain text.

singular subjects and objects, as well as
possessive pronouns. First person pronouns
were not weighted in the clustering algorithm,
because of the conflicting results from
previous works as discussed in 2.4 above, and
were therefore not reported.

As can be seen, a variety of features were
examined,
not
only
those
previously
determined as significant with regard to
deception detection. As discussed briefly
3.3 The Five Clusters
above, this was done in order to give a more
thorough outline of the style of each email.
The WEKA Expectation Maximum (EM)
Furthermore, the additional features may
algorithm was used to identify clusters within
reveal other potentially interesting features,
the created feature matrix (Hall et al., 2009).
and they contribute to an analysis of lexical
The algorithm was analyzed with 10-fold cross
diversity. As discussed above, lower lexical
validation, and was set to generate its own
diversity occurs with a lower frequency of
number of clusters (Hall et al., 2009). The
content words. This study assessed this by
table below outlines the clusters built by
taking into account the frequency of the
WEKA. The mean values for each feature, as
remaining weighted word types, including
well as their standard deviations, are
repeated and unique nouns, adjectives and
included. It is important to note that the
adverbs.
third singular feature includes words for third
Table 1 summarizes the features utilized in the cluster-based classifier. Mean values for each
feature’s frequency, as calculated across a cluster, are in standard font while standard deviations
are in italics.
Feature
Metadata
Subject length

Cluster 1
(74)

19.8934
13.2477
Email length
1.0148
0.1209
Emoticons
0.0540
0.2794
Raw punctuation 3.3141
20.8164
‘@’ or ‘#’
0
0.0454
Grammatical
features
Modal verbs
0
0.0041
Prepositions
0.0001
0.0008
Coordinators
0.0001
0.0006
Determiners
0
0
Adjectives
0.0021
0.0067
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Cluster 2
(35)

Cluster 3
(137)

Cluster 4
(74)

Cluster 5
(85)

20.2261
11.8727
4.3292
2.2240
0
0.1252
1.6032
0.7167
0.0303
0.0997

17.1884
8.7631
7.5018
4.6405
0.0237
0.0779
1.6197
0.7265
0 0.0002

21.3642
11.9969
3.5584
2.8894
0.0007
0.0089
1.4976
1.6505
0
0.0454

22.5450
10.3724
10.4032
7.3635
0
0.0001
1.7495
0.5947
0.0156
0.0541

0.0090
0.0057
0.0167
0.0092
0.0039
0.0034
0.0116
0.0061
0.0049
0.0046

0.0031
0.0028
0.0148
0.0075
0.0046
0.0037
0.0156
0.0072
0.0092
0.0076

0.0008
0.0016
0.0139
0.0107
0.0008
0.0016
0.0143
0.0103
0.0060
0.0090

0.0041
0.0031
0.0178
0.0053
0.0039
0.0027
0.0153
0.0056
0.0071
0.0043
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Feature
Adverbs
‘To’

JDFSL V9N2

Cluster 1
(74)
0.0011
0.0066
0
0

Cluster 2
(35)
0.0039
0.0040
0.0028
0.0031

Cluster 3
(137)
0.0062
0.0063
0.0057
0.0049

Cluster 4
(74)
0.0053
0.0086
0.0031
0.0043

Cluster 5
(85)
0.0072
0.0061
0.0050
0.0033

0.0009
0.0073
0
0.0015
0
0.0026
0
0.0010
0
0.0005

0.0029
0.0044
0.0001
0.0005
0.0006
0.0019
0 0.0003
0
0.0005

0.0047
0.0060
0.0010
0.0021
0.0003
0.0009
0
0
0.0001
0.0003

0.0015
0.0030
0.0006
0.0018
0.0012
0.0039
0
0.0010
0
0.0005

0.0023
0.0027
0.0007
0.0015
0.0008
0.0018
0.0019
0.0016
0.0006
0.0011

0
0.0001
0.0001
0.0011
0
0

0.0125
0.0064
0.0091
0.0067
0.0029
0.0035

0.0090
0.0065
0.0190
0.0095
0.0065
0.0049

0.0042
0.0058
0.0150
0.0124
0.0071
0.0082

0.0082
0.0046
0.0165
0.0066
0.0079
0.0049

0.0015
0.0081
0.0235
0.0533

0.0006
0.0012
0.0811
0.0234

0.0001
0.0003
0.0653
0.0209

0.0004
0.0016
0.0870
0.0314

0.0007
0.0009
0.0601
0.0135

0.0002
0.0020
0
0.0021

0.0005
0.0014
0.0001
0.0005

0.0022
0.0039
0.0025
0.0038

0.0004
0.0013
0.0004
0.0010

0.0014
0.0022
0.0013
0.0027

Pronouns
2nd
2nd possessive
3rd sg.
3rd pl.
3rd pl. possessive
Verb types
Base
Present tense
Past tense
Nouns
Repeated nouns
Unique nouns
Wh- words
No pronouns
Wh- pronouns

Cluster 2 is the most interesting of the
clusters above, for several reasons. It has high
frequencies of modal, base and present tense
verbs, medium to high frequencies of second
person pronouns and high frequencies of
function words (most notably, prepositions
and coordinators). This is combined with
medium to very low frequencies of unique and
repeated nouns (although the means are
relatively high, the standard deviation is as
well), medium to low frequencies of adjectives
and adverbs, and medium to long email
bodies, this cluster is a candidate for human
review. Cluster 5 too has high frequencies of
these features, and given the small numbers of
emails placed into these clusters (120), human
review for both is plausible, although this may
not always be the case.
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3.4 Individual Feature Analysis
Table 2, which summarizes the results of the
second method discussed in 4.2 above, can be
found below. Mean values for each feature
were calculated across the entire data set. The
statistical significance values are standard
deviations from the mean. The final column is
the number of emails with values which are
statistically significant in the direction under
scrutiny; that is, higher frequencies of features
are more important. Even in the case of
lexical diversity this is true, because the
model should not be drawing attention to
emails with high unique content.
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Table 2 shows the features examined, their corpus-wide means and standard deviations. The
final column identifies the number of emails in the corpus with significant values for each
feature.
Feature

Mean value

Metadata
Subject length
20.50617
Email length
4.935802
Emoticons
0.0136596
Raw punctuation
1.905513
‘@’ or ‘#’
0.0070054
Grammatical features
Modal verbs
0.0027279
Prepositions
0.0125777
Coordinators
0.0021978
Determiners
0.0116533
Adjectives
0.0057991
Adverbs
0.0047896
‘To’
0.0031837
Pronouns
st
0.0044918
1 sg.
st
0.0002954
1 sg. possessive
st
0.00092
1 pl.
st
0.000301
1 pl. possessive
2nd
0.0021805
3rd sg.
0.0006766
3rd pl.
0.0003241
rd
0.0001186
3 pl. possessive
Verb
types
Base
0.006042
Present tense
0.0122779
Past tense
0.0052184
Nouns
Repeated nouns
0.0006551
Unique nouns
0.0668139
Wh- words
No pronouns
0.0008137
Wh- pronouns
0.0006929

As can be seen, there are fewer emails
found significant on this per-feature basis (the
maximum of which was 79) than those
identified in clusters 2 and 5 (n=120). This is
likely because of the flexibility of the
clustering algorithm and weighting system.
Not every email in the relevant clusters had
significant values for every feature; they
simply had a high enough proportion of
significant features as to pattern together.
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Standard
deviation

Number of emails
with significant
values (out of 405)

11.67137
5.053753
0.1252213
9.005654
0.0454155

75
55
7
5
13

0.0041302
0.0101776
0.0030283
0.0093803
0.0075239
0.0072721
0.0040969

60
64
69
60
52
45
71

0.0061031
0.0013422
0.002454
0.001155
0.0048731
0.0026263
0.0009732
0.0005079

27
23
36
28
39
28
43
25

0.0066367
0.0111024
0.0064449

79
61
54

0.0036768
0.0396788

10
55

0.002271
0.0021356

37
35

3.5 Analysis
Overall, these two methods pointed to similar
potentially-deviant collection subsets, with the
latter suggesting fewer in total. Although this
second, smaller subset returned more precise
results, its recall may be too low and the
cluster model may be more fitting for smaller
data sets more suited to human review. The
smaller subset is problematic for the collection
size being tested (about 400 emails in total
from the author in question) in this instance,
because its overlap with keyword search is
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fairly large (for example, 22 of the 41 emails
which had statistically significant modal and
base verb features were also returned by
keyword searching).
The emails in clusters 2 and 5 contained
more disparate data, including a number of
personal contacts (discussing topics such as
golf plans and his job dissatisfaction) and
business related emails in a more informal
linguistic style (discussing and justifying
several notable business practices which he
was later prosecuted for) that were not
identified by keyword search.
One interesting pattern which emerged
was that a few of his emails in cluster 5,
especially those in a more informal style,
contained descriptions and unflattering
characterizations of those involved in business
situations he disagreed with, along with
information about what those situations were
in general terms. While these records are
undoubtedly relevant (both from an ediscovery and investigative perspective), he
does not refer to the people he is describing
by name; sometimes he does not even refer to
them by the company they work for. This,
combined with a general vagueness, lack of
nouns he usually associates with his workplace
and no use of notable keywords resulted in
some of these emails not being returned by
keyword searching. Additional emails in this
style were returned by searching some of the
most general keywords (such as trade and
trading), although any more sophisticated
filtering mechanism, such as requiring more
than one keyword, would have eliminated the
record as irrelevant.
It is important to note that both of these
methods in essence divide texts by their
writing style, and then select subsets based on
the concentration of frequencies of deceptionassociated features.
Brennan, Afroz and
Greenstadt (2012) demonstrated that it may
be possible for authors to obfuscate their
writing style purposefully. While Brennan,
Afroz and Greenstadt (2012) focuses on
concealing an author’s identity, the ability for
participants to confuse stylometric tools by
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attempting to write differently suggests that
it may be possible to consciously alter one’s
writing style to change the distribution of
certain
features.
These
stylistic
countermeasures may be detectable, however
(Afroz, Brennan, & Greenstadt, 2012; Juola,
2012).

4. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated, linguistic methods for
deception detection can contribute to ediscovery search by stratifying the data and
highlighting records which may otherwise go
undetected during a search phase. Although
this classifier method does not replace current
search technologies and some results may be
overlapping, it can be effectively utilized
alongside them to bring attention to unusual
and interesting emails. Further investigation
is needed to determine what search methods
best compliment the proposed model.
Additional verification is also recommended,
preferably with a data set in which deceptive
texts are identified, so that empirical, groundtruthed testing may be undertaken. Research
into the ability of an author to purposefully
conceal deceptive indicators would also be
highly recommended.
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